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Introduction
Following the adoption of several EU directives that
liberalised importnat sectors such as telecommunica-
tions, postal services, transport and electricity, regulation
by national regulatory authorities (NRAs) is ‘rapidly
becoming the most important mode of regulation, indeed
the leading edge of public policy-making in Europe’.1
This article will discuss whether the EU regulatory
governance structure of the telecommunications and
electricity sector provides for sufficient instruments to
assure effective implementation of EU policy.
Independence from governmental interference has
been regarded as the main concern and has been described
and analysed extensi-
vely.2  Yet indepen-
dence is not sufficient
to ensure effective
regulation in the inter-
nal market. The EU
rules should not only
require that NRAs are
independent but should also facilitate co-operation
among them and insist on more transparency of national
regulatory decision-making.
Liberalisation
Since the EU has been granted the responsibility to
liberalise the movement of capital, goods, services and
workers across Member States, its main policy objective
has been to improve the functioning of the internal
market and to boost competition. It considers monopolies
as harming for the internal market and ensures for that
reason that EU competition rules apply, even to public
undertakings. Frequently, these monopolies have been
formed in the network industries like telecommu-
nications, transport and energy.
In order to be able to apply the competition rules in
these sectors, the Commission makes a distinction
between network infrastructure and services provided
over that infrastructure. It considers it possible and
desirable to create competitive conditions in respect to
services and has thus initiated legislation to liberalise,
among others, the telecom and electricity sector. The
Commission has based its liberalisation directives on
this concept of separating the network infrastructure
from the commercial activities. Since Member State
governments often have a stake in the commercial
activities of these network companies, the directives
require Member States to separate their regulatory
function from their
ownership function
in order to avoid
conflicts of interests.
If governments want
to hold on to their
stake in these
companies – and
since almost all governments do – they have to establish
an independent regulatory authority to regulate the
network.
Implementation
Although it may be beneficial for the EU Member States
to agree on liberalisation of their domestic utility markets,
each individual Member State has an incentive to
interpret the rules in such a way that is advantageous for
its own market structure.3  This is because adjustment to
a different – albeit common – regulatory structure
involves costs. Therefore, a Member State has an
incentive to structure and monitor its NRA so as to
ensure that its regulations serve its narrow national
interest. This will raise costs for those companies wishing
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to deliver services in more than one Member State
because they have to adapt to different regulatory
structures. For this reason, the debate surrounding the
creation of NRAs revolved around institutional
independence and the monitoring of these NRAs.
Since the Commission acts as Guardian of the Treaty,
it is its task to monitor transposition of EU law and
supervise the functioning of the internal market. Yet
Member States have ‘institutional autonomy’ regarding
the designing and monitoring of organisations such as
NRAs, that have been delegated the task to implement
the liberalisation po-
licy. This makes the
EU regulatory gover-
nance structure rather
complex and can
create problems for
the Commission to
assure effective im-
plementation of the
policy. As Yatanagas4
notes; “…there is an institutional vacuum between EU
legislators and the implementation of European laws by
the national authorities at the Member State level. The
absence of adequate features of conflict resolution and
an unequal expertise and independence of the national
regulator further undermines the efficiency of the
system.” Different national institutional settings and
monitoring of NRAs, lack of cross-country regulatory
impact assessment procedures and weak decision-making
procedure between NRA and Commission may impede
effective application of EU law or may even lead to
possible ‘regulatory divergence’. Somehow the Commis-
sion has to advocate NRA independence and create
appropriate regulatory decision-making procedures
between NRAs, Member States and itself and among all
sectoral NRAs in the EU to avoid any conflict while
respecting the individual Member States’ institutional
autonomy.
Telecommunications and electricity sector
Both telecom and electricity industries are constructed
around extensive and expensive infrastructure. Tele-
communication requires (often) wires and cables to
transport information. Electricity requires generators
and power grids for transport. This infrastructure is
necessary to deliver services to end-users but gives the
owner of it a strategic asset to control the whole industry,
which represents its monopoly characteristic. Despite
these similarities, the networks differ in important
technicalities. First, the electricity network is normally
divided into three systems: generation, transport and
distribution, all requiring expensive grids. Furthermore,
economically feasible alternatives for cable and wire in
the telecom network exist, like mobile telephony and
wireless internet, to an extent that does not exist in the
electricity network. Moreover, electricity transportation
is sensitive to distance. Distance increases electricity
losses. Finally, electricity operators must invest for the
supply at peak capacity while operating only parts of
this generation capacity under normal demand. These
characteristics would suggest that competition in the
telecom sector will be more easily achieved than in the
electricity sector. Nonetheless, both industries have
become the subject of EU liberalisation.
The Single European Act gave the Commission the
power to liberalise the Member States’ telecom market.
At that time, the provisions for telecommunications
were entrusted to national telecom operators in almost
all EU Member States, often organised as a ministerial
unit or as a publicly owned company. They incorporated
the roles of policy-
maker, service pro-
vider and market re-
gulator at the same
time. External and
internal pressures led
the Commission to
initiate legislation to
restructure the Mem-
ber States’ telecom
markets however. It accepted in first instance the exclu-
sive rights for the telecom operators, giving them a
dominant position in their domestic market, except in
the case of cross-border trade. Nonetheless, they had to
be subject to the condition that a regulator independent
from all public and private undertakings would monitor
them. Subsequent legislation in the early ’90s removed
the exclusive and special rights, granted more respon-
sibilities to the NRAs and put certain obligations on
telecom operators. By 1 January 1998, the national
telecom markets in the EU have been fully liberalised.
Based on a review of the telecom legislation, the EU has
adopted a regulatory framework package incorporating
all directives in 2002. The package’s Framework
Directive focuses solely on NRAs. This directive
guarantees their independence, lays down a large set of
tasks and regulates the relation between the NRA and
the Commission.
The electricity industry was deliberately not men-
tioned in the Singe European Act however. Nevertheless,
the Commission was keen to liberalise this market too.
Its overall plan was to gradually abolish or change the
existing monopolies for the import and export of
electricity and gas and then move on to production,
transmission and distribution, within an EU-wide
regulatory framework. The first electricity (and gas)
directive set up a regime with multiple options for the
Member States to liberalise and regulate their domestic
markets. Yet experience demonstrated that this situation
lead to distortion of competition in the internal market.
The new electricity directive as adopted in June 2003
nullifies to a large extent the deficiencies of the previous
directives. It abolishes the choice for network access,
lays down the principle of reciprocity concerning market
opening and obliges Member States to legally separate
the transmission and distribution network operators
from other parts of business. In addition, all Member
States have to establish a regulatory authority with a
minimum set of regulatory powers.
Somehow the Commission has
to advocate NRA independence
and create appropriate regulatory
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NRA independence and monitoring
It is vital for utility markets that regulation comes from
an organisation independent from all interested parties.
Since most Member State governments still have a share
in their incumbent utility company, EU law does not
consider them as independent. Recent EU telecom
legislation therefore requires them to establish a legally
and functional independent regulatory organisation
and delegate certain powers to it. The telecom framework
directive even states that those Member States that
retain ownership or control over a telecom company
have to ensure effective separation of its regulatory
function from its ownership or control function.
The majority of the EU Member States had already
opted to establish a regulatory authority in the telecom
sector before the Framework Directive comes into force.
These national regulatory authorities are organisa-
tionally separate from the central government and operate
independently from the ministry responsible for their
sectoral policy. Some regulators in the electricity
resemble more ministerial agencies though, realising
the requirements in the present legislation but lacking
the decision-making discretion telecom NRAs have.
The new electricity directive obliges them to establish
regulatory authorities similar to those in the telecom
sector. Table 1 shows the NRAs by Member State in both
sectors.
Luxembourg has a single institution endowed with
regulatory powers for the telecommunications, post,
electricity and gas markets. Germany has not established
a regulatory authority for electricity. Its approach is
based on general instead of sector specific regulations.
Issues like prices and access to the electricity network
can be brought before the German Federal Cartel Office.
The system is supplemented by voluntary agreements
among electricity companies. North-Ireland has its own
electricity NRA but is not incorporated in the list.
Analysis from national legislation shows that all
Table 1: National Telecommunications and Electricity Regulatory Authorities
Member State Telecom NRA Electricity NRA
Austria Telekom-Control-Kommission (TCK) Energie-Control GmbH (E-Control)
Belgium Institut Belge des Services Postaux et Commission de Régulation de
de Télécommunications (BIPT) l’Electricité et du Gaz (CREG)
Denmark National IT and Telecom Agency Danish Energy Regulatory Authority
(NITA) (DERA)
Finland Finish Communications Regulatory Energy Market Authority (EMV)
Authority (FIORCA)
France Autorité de Régulation de Commission de Régulation de
Télécommunications l’Energie (CRE)
Germany Regulierungsbehoerde für –
Telekommunikation und Post (Reg TP)
Greece National Telecommunications and Regulatory Authority of Energy
Post Commission (EETT) (RAE)
Ireland Commission for Communications Commission for Energy Regulation
Regulation (ComReg) (CER)
Italy Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Autorita per l’Energia Elettrica e il
Comunicazioni (AGCOM) Gas (AEEG)
Luxembourg Institut Luxembourgeois de Régulation (ILR)
The Netherlands Onafhankelijke Post en Dienst uitvoering en toezicht
Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA) Energie (DTe)
Portugal Autoridade Nacional de Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços
Comunicações (ANACOM) Energéticos (ERSE)
Spain Comisión del Mercado de las Comisión Nacional de Energía
Telecomunicaciones (CMT) (CNE)
Sweden National Post and Telecom Agency Swedish National Energy Agency
(PTS) (STEM)
United Kingdom Office of Telecomunications (OFTEL) Office of Gas and Electricity
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telecom NRAs have sufficient statutory independence
either provided by specific or general laws, except
perhaps the Belgian BIPT.5 Regarding the monitoring
instruments, they are rather similar across the NRAs. The
authorities are almost all financed by fees paid by
market companies they regulate, although some are still
partly or fully financed by the state budget. The head or
college members of the NRAs are most of the time
appointed by the national government for a period
longer than four years and sometimes even indefinite.
Nonetheless, the German Reg TP, for example, has to co-
operate with a Beirat consisting of MPs appointed by
the government. Reg TP is obliged to respond to
proposals of the Beirat. And in Italy, the procedure to
elect AGCOM commission members is rather politicised
with each House of Parliament electing four commis-
sioners.
Co-operation among national regulatory authorities
Sufficient independence says little about the other
problems mentioned above by Yatanagas. Of course,
each NRA focuses on regulating its domestic market yet
they also have to support the development of the internal
market. In able to do so they need to know how other
NRAs regulate in order to be able to take account of each
other’s decisions.
The Framework Directive is quite unambiguous
about it. In cases concerning market definition, market
analysis procedure and regulations affecting trade
between Member
States, a NRA has to
inform and state its
arguments about its
draft regulation to the
Commission and the
other NRAs so they
can make comments
about the draft. However, national telecom legislation
mentions only in a few cases co-operation with foreign
NRAs. Consequently, the Commission has sought to
institutionalise this co-operation obligation into a formal
network of telecom NRAs. The NRAs already established
the informal Independent Regulators Group (IRG),
including those of the EFTA countries, in 1997 to co-
ordinate and to develop an integrated information
system. The voluntary activities of the IRG have now
been formalised with the Commission decision to
establish the European Regulators Group (ERG). The
Group will act as an interface between the NRAs and the
Commission. Its main tasks are to give advice to the
Commission and to organise the consultation procedure
regarding the above mentioned topics. The Commission
is represented at appropriate levels and will possibly
give secretarial support. What is exceptional about the
ERG is that it is a European group of national represen-
tatives who do not represent the Member State, but the
national regulatory authorities instead.
Similar actions have occurred among the electricity
NRAs. They have established the informal Council for
European Energy Regulators (CEER) in 2000. Its aim is
also to exchange information, experience, and views
and to establish common policies among its members
towards the electricity and gas market. Representatives
of the Commission may attend the CEER’s meeting.
An additional advantage of these EU network
organisations, other than co-operation, is that they
provide peer group review. They evaluate each other’s
functioning by means of best practice reports. The IRG/
ERG has conducted several studies in the form of a
‘principles of implementation and best practices’. The
CEER has carried out similar studies. These networks
can improve the functioning of the internal market for
electricity and telecom.
European Commission
In order to prevent possible deadlock between an NRA
and the Commission, or even regulatory divergence,
some form of a hierarchical relation is considered
necessary. Although it is legally possible for the
Commission to centralise regulatory decision-making in
the telecom sector by establishing a European Regulatory
Authority for telecommunications, it has abstained from
doing so. A single European authority is politically too
sensitive and bureaucratically too cumbersome.6 It would
simply loose the current flexibility to include national
market circumstances in its regulations. Nonetheless,
some active involvement of the Commission in national
regulatory decision-making is desired.
Early telecom directives simply stated that the NRAs
should co-operate
with the Commission.
The Framework Di-
rective gives more
comprehensive pro-
visions to settle any
conflicts between a
NRA and the Com-
mission though. If the latter considers that an NRA draft
regulation concerning market definition, market analysis
procedure or trade would create a barrier to the internal
market or if it has doubts about its compatibility with
Community policy objectives, regulatory principles or
law, then it can suspend the draft regulation for a period
of two months. Subsequently the Commission may take
a decision in accordance with the necessary commit-
tology procedure requiring the NRA to withdraw its
draft regulation. In other words, the Commission can
veto a NRA when it regards a draft measure incompatible
with internal market rules. And if necessary, it can
choose to open its own investigation under the Treaty’s
competition rules.
Transparency
Another instrument the Commission can use is
enhancement of transparency in regulatory decision-
making. Transparency obligations will force a NRA to
make its arguments public. Undue reasoning or even
government influence will be easier to detect. Moreover,
transparency is already a deterrent enough to prevent
governments to try to sway outcomes in their own
Effective implementation of the
EU regulatory policy can still be
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benefit. Consequently, more transparency reduces the
uncertainty for market companies. The Commission has
followed this course from the beginning of the
liberalisation processes. Each directive contained
provisions that the NRA has to proceed in decision-
making process in an ‘objective, non-discriminatory
and transparent’ manner. The Framework Directive states
that the NRAs have to establish a consultation procedure
to give interested parties the opportunity to comment
and to publish regulations and outcomes of dispute
resolutions. The electricity directive is less outspoken
about transparency procedures. Both directives are silent
about how the NRAs organise their regulatory decision-
making procedure though.
Conclusions and policy implications
The EU is on the right track as regards the telecom sector
with the Framework Directive. It sets out a clear
obligation for the Member States to establish an
organisationally independent regulatory authority, it
institutionalises NRA co-operation and it gives the
Commission the possibility to veto a NRA decisions.
The Electricity Directives is not that far yet partly due
to the fact that national ministries still play the most
significant role in regulating and the later start of the
liberalisation process.
Yet effective implementation of the EU regulatory
policy can still be improved in both sectors. Analogous
to the American Regulatory Planning and Review Order,
the Commission should set general regulatory principles.
Although the Framework Directive outlines regulatory
principles, these principles concentrate on sectoral
regulations instead on general regulations. Such general
regulatory principles should include determination of
the market failure that the regulator wants to address,
regulatory impact assessments and regulatory planning.
These regulatory principles are in the American
regulatory governance system closely linked to the
Administrative Procedure Act. This Act lays down clear
transparency obligations concerning decision-making,
publication and consultation procedures for all federal
agencies. Similar European legislation would help to
provide consistent transparent regulatory decision-
making of NRAs in all Member States and provide
companies with more certainty. Strong NRA indepen-
dence, the establishment of network arrangements and
enhanced transparency will diminish the role of the
Member States and strengthen the direct link between
Commission and NRA in the EU regulatory governance
structure. Ultimately, new relations between national
regulatory authorities, Member State governments and
European Commission will emerge.
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